U.S. Department of State Report
Report to the Congress on the Anti-Thai Riots in Cambodia on January 29, 2003
Released by the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific AffairsMay 14, 2003
This report is submitted pursuant to the following request by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees in the Conference Report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2003 (P.L. 108-7), section 560 on April 24, 2003:
The managers condemn the recent riots in Cambodia and are concerned with the Cambodian government's failure to protect foreign embassies and foreign-owned businesses in Phnom Penh. The managers note that in a statement issued on February 6, 2003, the State Department stated that the United States was "particularly concerned by indications that the government is using the situation to target the political opposition and independent media." The managers request that within 60 days of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State report to the Committees on Appropriations on the complicity of the Cambodian government in the riots (including an explanation of the failure of Cambodian authorities to respond to the riots in a timely and effective manner), and steps taken by the governments of Thailand and Cambodia to credibly investigate the riots. The managers encourage the administration to continue to forcefully and publicly condemn election-related violence and intimidation in the run up to the July parliamentary elections.
Summary
Cambodian demonstrators broke into and burned the Thai Embassy on January 29, 2003, then moved on to methodically attack other Thai businesses, including the Samart and Shinowatra telecommunications firms. The demonstrators also burned down the Royal Phnom Penh Hotel and vandalized the Juliana Hotel. Damage to the embassy and Thai businesses has been estimated at about USD 50 million, although business claims for compensation are subject to negotiation with the Cambodian government. No Cambodian businesses were attacked and no Thai citizens were seriously injured, although many were threatened.
These acts of violence caused great damage to Thai-Cambodian relations and even more damage to Cambodia's international reputation and economic development. This report describes the events leading up to the January 29 riots and the role of the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC), focusing particularly on its slow response to the riots. This report also reviews the subsequent investigations of the riots conducted by the governments of Thailand and Cambodia, which have not yet concluded.
The Department concludes that, based on the available evidence, the Cambodian government authorities were irresponsible with nationalistic rhetoric and incompetent in handling the unfolding crisis, and bear responsibility for having failed to take decisive action to protect Thai diplomatic premises and commercial property once peaceful demonstrations turned violent.
I. A Brief Chronology
In the days prior to January 29, Cambodians became increasingly incensed over alleged remarks by a Thai actress, Suwanan Kongying, who had supposedly commented in a cable television interview that she would perform in Cambodia only after Cambodia returned the Angkor Wat temples to Thailand. Circulated by word-of-mouth through Cambodia for months, her alleged remarks were first reported by the Cambodian media on January 18 in a small pro-government newspaper, Reaksmei Angkor. We have seen no independent confirmation of these remarks, and she denied making them. On January 27, Prime Minister Hun Sen commented in a widely televised public ceremony that Suwanan was not even worth the "blades of grass" at Angkor Wat. Student demonstrators later quoted Hun Sen's remarks as justification for their activities. Anti-Thai leaflets were distributed to students in the days prior to the demonstrations. These actions exploited long-standing Cambodian wariness of the Thai, based on a widespread perception that Thais look down on Cambodians.
Students made up the bulk of demonstrators at the Thai Embassy during the daylight hours of January 29, when the demonstration was peaceful. However, in the late afternoon, according to eyewitnesses, the demonstration was taken over by the "Pagoda Boys," ostensibly an organization of male students in their twenties from the provinces, that the municipal authorities had previously used to break up anti-government demonstrations. Throughout the day, Thai Embassy officers, including the Ambassador, appealed to their RGC contacts to provide additional security to the embassy. Eventually, Prime Minister Thaksin contacted Prime Minister Hun Sen to request protection for the embassy and Thai businesses. Between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. the demonstrators burned a Thai flag and then automobile tires. Unfounded rumors that the Cambodian Embassy in Bangkok had been burned and Cambodian diplomats killed by Thai protesters exacerbated the situation. At about 6:00 p.m., approximately 50 demonstrators scaled the embassy fence and entered the embassy compound. There were only around ten national police officers present at that time, who took no action. They were subsequently reinforced by 10 to 20 additional policemen. Within minutes, more demonstrators entered the compound and at about 6:30 p.m., the mob entered the chancery, looting and setting fires. These fires gutted the embassy and ambassador's residence. Most of the embassy staff, including the ambassador escaped out the back of the embassy, climbing over a fence at the rear of the building. Only one embassy staffer was hurt, in a fall from the fence, although several diplomats narrowly escaped injury as they sought refuge in the Royal Phnom Penh Hotel and elsewhere. Reports indicate some attempted assaults against Thais, but none resulting in serious harm.
Following the burning of the embassy, the demonstrators systematically moved from one Thai-owned business to another, joined by motorcyclists, looting some businesses, burning others. At about 8:30 p.m., two hours after the demonstrators burned the Thai Embassy, Military Police appeared on the streets and began to suppress the demonstrations, firing their weapons in the air to intimidate the mobs and deploying armored personnel carriers. Sporadic fighting and gunshots took place throughout the night. A few demonstrators appeared to have sustained gunshot wounds, but no deaths were reported.
Royal Thai Government Response
The Royal Thai Government (RTG) reacted swiftly and angrily to the January 29 sacking of its Embassy and Thai-owned businesses in Phnom Penh. As early as January 28, Thai Ambassador Chatchawed Chartsuwan had requested additional security protection for his Embassy from the Cambodian authorities. The RGC provided only assurances. As the demonstrators grew more agitated on January 29, the Ambassador's requests became more urgent and were reinforced, as noted above, by telephone calls from Prime Minister Thaksin. Other Bangkok-based government and military officials called their Cambodian counterparts, still to no avail.
In the aftermath of the rioting, PM Thaksin ordered a military air evacuation operation for Thai diplomatic personnel and nationals (which was carried out successfully on January 30). The RTG recalled its diplomats, downgraded Thai-Cambodian diplomatic relations to charge d'affaires level, and suspended its program of technical and economic cooperation with Cambodia. In Bangkok, on January 30 angry demonstrators gathered outside the Cambodian Embassy. The King of Thailand called on the demonstrators to disperse, and the police maintained order, thus defusing the situation.
In its Aide Memoire of January 30 to the Cambodian Ambassador, the RTG set three basic conditions for restoration of normal relations: 1) full explanation by the RGC for its failure to respond to Thai requests for protection; 2) full compensation for all losses incurred by the RTG, its diplomatic personnel and Thai nationals; and, 3) justice for the perpetrators of the violence and those instigators responsible for it.
Diplomatic Efforts to Resolve the Crisis
In the ensuing months, the Thai government sent several teams to Phnom Penh for preliminary investigations, joined a bilateral Committee for the Normalization of Thailand-Cambodia Relations, and began negotiations to determine damages and compensation. However, tensions remained high, and for a period land borders were closed on both sides (but have now been reopened). Diplomatic efforts to resolve the problems continued.
II. Cambodian Government Involvement
The RGC has revealed little about its decision-making on January 29, but the government clearly bears major responsibility for having failed to prevent or moderate the violence. Circumstantial evidence permits some conclusions to be drawn. A number of RGC leaders, including Prime Minister Hun Sen, have commented publicly that they did not expect the demonstrations to get out of hand so quickly and turn violent. As events unfolded on January 29, the RGC leadership was monitoring the situation closely. Hun Sen remarked on February 3 that senior RGC officials met throughout the night at his residence and that he listened to police radio communications. Other senior officials monitored the situation by means of cellular phone calls from observers at the scene. Moreover, both the Ministry of Interior, which controls the national police, and the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) headquarters are in the same block as the Thai Embassy.
Despite awareness of developments, authorities were slow to react. Some Cambodian leaders, including the Prime Minister, have suggested that the police could not suppress the demonstrations because to do so would have involved firing on them. Others have suggested that confused lines of authority between the national police and military police contributed to the paralysis.
Was the slow response deliberate? Students involved in this and other demonstrations have remarked that, unlike in previous demonstrations, there were too few police to handle the demonstrators, and the usual array of police cars and fire trucks was absent. Also, the active participation by the Pagoda Boys gang in this demonstration, and their apparent leadership role, fueled the violence. At no time did policemen at the embassy demonstrate the will to defuse the demonstration. The U.S. Embassy in Phnon Penh confirmed that Senior military police officers had commented that they could not mount a response because they had not received authorization from higher levels. (Note: Under the current government, senior officials are unable to make important decisions without authorization from the Prime minister or his closest aides.) A contributing factor to the slow response may have been the breakdown of the cellular telephone system, which occurred either because of an overload in calls or the destruction of Thai-owned telecommunications businesses. The Governor of Phnom Penh, Chea Sophara, was reportedly returning from a provincial trip during the critical period. Theories that the slow response was the result of RGC intervention, possibly in combination with other factors, have not been definitively refuted. While we do not know the intent of the RGC, the preponderance of the evidence shows that Cambodian government authorities were irresponsible with nationalistic rhetoric and incompetent in handling the unfolding crisis.
III. Cambodian and Thai Government Investigations
In the days following the riots, the RGC was quick to blame "extremists," suggesting without naming him that opposition leader Sam Rainsy was behind the riots. The police arrested up to 175 persons, most of them students and looters. They also arrested Mom Sonando, owner of Cambodia's only independent radio station, Beehive radio, a station often critical of the government, and the editor of Reaksmei Angkor, the pro-government newspaper that first published the stories on the Thai actress's remarks. Sonando was arrested for disseminating the rumors regarding attacks on the Cambodian Embassy in Bangkok. The radio broadcast comments from callers repeating these rumors. However, the radio station did not begin its call-in program until about 8:30 p.m., long after the Thai Embassy was in flames.
Following the initial arrests, the government released most of the detainees, although pre-trial detention of six months is permissible under Cambodian law. Dates for the trials of the remaining 57 who were indicted, including a prominent student leader, have not yet been set. Mom Sonando was released on bail after high-level appeals. The RGC transferred the Governor of Phnom Penh, Chea Sophara, to be advisor to the Prime Minister and reassigned the commander of the Phnom Penh military police unit, in the weeks after the riots, but denied that either move was related to accountability for the riots.
Immediately after the riots, numerous embassies in Phnom Penh, including the U.S. Embassy, requested that the RGC conduct a thorough investigation of the events of January 29. The French Ambassador, as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, wrote formally to the Foreign Minister with this request. The RGC has not provided a written response to these requests, although it has assured the diplomatic community that it has taken steps to ensure that such an event will not happen again. The concrete steps taken to date include the provision of more security personnel for some embassies, closer coordination on embassy security issues, and stricter enforcement of regulations regarding the holding of public demonstrations. In addition, the Cambodian police have established an anti-riot unit of approximately 220 men. This unit has little equipment and no riot control agents such as tear gas. However, our Embassy assesses the unit as apparently well-motivated with a good understanding of its mission. Lines of authority for deployment appear less clear. The unit is in desperate need of formal training, equipment and riot control agents.
The RGC named Deputy Police Commissioner Lieutenant General Neth Savoeun as chief of a government commission to investigate the riots. Subsequently, the government provided to the USG a 14-page interim report in Khmer on the riots and events leading up to them. The report outlines the function of the investigation commission, noting that it is responsible for working with the state prosecutor to develop criminal cases against alleged perpetrators. According to the report, the police are conducting an investigation to identify the ringleaders among the rioters. However, the report falls back on the government's earlier position blaming unidentified extremists for the riots. To date, there is no indication that any of the ringleaders have been brought to justice. The report also states that Hun Sen on January 27 and the RGC early on January 29 made statements meant to calm the public and prevent peaceful demonstrations from becoming violent. Specifically, the statements noted that the rumors about Suwanan Kongying's alleged remarks were not issues to be addressed by the respective governments of Thailand and Cambodia, but "personal issues." Information available to the USG indicates that these statements were made only late on January 29 when the riots were almost over.
The Cambodian report's description of the events on January 29 varies only slightly from the description in Sections I and II above. For example, the report states that there were 30 policemen at the Thai embassy from 2:00 p.m. on, and they were reinforced by another 50 officers and four fire trucks at 5:30 p.m.
The Cambodian report refers to two other instances of rioting in which Cambodians attacked foreign embassies, the 1965 attack on the U.S. Embassy and the 1970 attack on North Vietnam's Embassy. Both of these incidents led to a break in diplomatic relations with the countries involved. However, in the most recent incident the RGC has made every effort to restore bilateral relations with Thailand. The report refers to the historical background in explaining that the RGC had no reason to provoke the events of January 29, as it would not wish to undercut many of its own achievements, including cooperative relations with Thailand, or damage Cambodia's prestige.
Perhaps the RGC's full report on the January 29 riots will provide a more thorough explanation of these events and identify the "extremists" who provoked the demonstrators to violence. However, at this point the evidence indicates that the Royal Government of Cambodia bears responsibility for stirring nationalistic anti-Thai sentiment among Cambodians and for failing to take decisive action to protect the Thai Embassy and Thai commercial establishments once the peaceful demonstrations turned violent.
Dispatch of Thai Investigation Assistance Team Pending
The Thai government has accepted the RGC invitation to send a team to Cambodia to assist in continuing investigations into possible instigators and perpetrators involved in the January 29 riots. The small Thai team, which is expected to include legal experts from the Thai Attorney General's office and technical experts on criminal and Internet investigation from Thai Police Headquarters, has not yet been dispatched. The modalities of their participation in the Cambodian investigations have not yet been agreed. The Cambodian authorities have detained a number of suspects, but the RTG is waiting for the RGC to confirm its timetable for prosecution, which the Thai regard as necessary to set their own timetable for providing investigation assistance.
IV. Cambodian-Thai Bilateral Relations
On March 25, the Thai Cabinet lifted the prohibition on activities by Thai public agencies in Cambodia, which effectively ended the suspension of aid. As the basis for this decision, the RTG accepted that several developments indicated the intention and determination of the RGC to make amends. First, the RGC had accepted the conditions in the Thai Aide Memoire of January 30 for normalization and had begun to meet them. Second, the RGC had admitted to the satisfaction of the RTG that the events of January 29 had spun out of control because Cambodian authorities had "misjudged" the situation and had not provided proper security. Third, the Cambodian government undertook public relations campaigns to clarify facts about the bilateral relationship, i.e. to disavow the controversial claims about Thai designs on Angkor Wat that had originally enraged the Cambodian mob. Finally, the RGC had agreed to set up a Thailand-Cambodia Joint Cultural Association, which would work longer-term and systematically to promote understanding at the people-to-people level and to change course matter used in schools in both countries that tended to bias attitudes toward each other.
On April 11, the Royal Thai Government and the Royal Cambodian Government agreed to renew full diplomatic relations and were expected to once again exchange ambassadors on April 24.
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